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Heavier vehicles are safer for their own occupants but more hazardous for the occupants of other vehicles.
In this paper we estimate the increased probability of fatalities from being hit by a heavier vehicle
in a collision. We show that, controlling for own-vehicle weight, being hit by a vehicle that is 1,000
pounds heavier results in a 47% increase in the baseline fatality probability. Estimation results further
suggest that the fatality risk is even higher if the striking vehicle is a light truck (SUV, pickup truck,
or minivan). We calculate that the value of the external risk generated by the gain in fleet weight since
1989 is approximately 27 cents per gallon of gasoline. We further calculate that the total fatality externality
is roughly equivalent to a gas tax of $1.08 per gallon. We consider two policy options for internalizing
this external cost: a gas tax and an optimal weight varying mileage tax. Comparing these options, we
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  The  average  weight  of  light  vehicles  sold  in  the  United  States  has  fluctuated 
substantially over the past 35 years. From 1975 to 1980, average weight dropped almost 
1,000 pounds (from 4,060 pounds to 3,228 pounds), likely in response to rising gasoline 
prices  and  the  passage  of  the  Corporate  Average  Fuel  Efficiency  (CAFE)  standard.  As 
gasoline prices fell in the late-1980s, however, average vehicle weight began to rise, and by 
2005 it had attained 1975 levels (US EPA 2009). A rich body of research examines the 
effects of CAFE and gasoline prices on consumers’ vehicle choices (Goldberg 1998; Portney 
et  al.  2003;  Kleit  2004;  Austin  and  Dinan  2005;  Klier  and  Linn  2008;  Bento,  Goulder, 
Jacobsen, and von Haefen, 2009; Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer 2009; Li, Timmins, and 
Von Haefen 2009). 
  One question that remains unresolved is how traffic fatalities are affected by the 
choices consumers make in response to gasoline prices and fuel economy standards. Traffic 
accidents are the leading cause of death for persons under the age of 40, and they are a major 
source of life-years lost.
1 Intuitively, heavier cars are safer than lighter cars, and previous 
research has argued that a heavier vehicle fleet is a safer vehicle fleet (Crandall and Graham 
1989). Much of the subsequent transportation safety literature has focused on the effects of 
average vehicle weight on safety, reaching varying conclusions.
2 Jacobsen (2010) extends this 
literature by exploring the traffic safety implications of different fuel economy regulatory 
schemes across ten vehicle classes. The paper uses data on fatal accidents and concludes that 
tightening fuel economy standards will not increase fatalities as long as the standards are 
“footprint based” or unified across cars and trucks.
3 
                                                 
1  Lung  cancer,  a  disease  that  is  generally  the  result  of  smoking,  kills  approximately  four  times  as  many 
Americans each year as traffic accidents. However, the average lung cancer decedent is 71 years old while the 
average traffic accident decedent is only 39 years old. The number of life-years lost to traffic accidents is thus 
similar in magnitude to the number of life-years lost to lung cancer.  
2 Most of the transportation safety literature is based on time series correlations between average vehicle weight 
and aggregate fatality rates (Robertson 1991; Khazzoom 1994; Noland 2004, 2005; Ahmad and Greene 2005). 
Two exceptions are Kahane (2003) and Van Auken and Zellner (2005), which use micro data concerning fatal 
accidents only. They supplement the fatal accident data with data on police-reported accidents from several 
states to estimate the rate at which different types of vehicles enter into collisions. These studies come to 
varying conclusions regarding the sign of the relationship between average vehicle weight and overall fatality 
rates, but all conclude that the magnitude of the relationship is relatively modest. 
3  If  the  current  separation  between  cars  and  trucks  is  maintained  and  standards  are  not  footprint  based, 
Jacobsen estimates that raising CAFE standards by one mile per gallon could increase traffic fatalities by 149  
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  From  an  economic  standpoint,  however,  an  unregulated  vehicle  fleet  must  be 
inefficiently heavy. A heavier vehicle is safer for its own occupants but more hazardous for 
the occupants of other vehicles. The safety benefits of vehicle weight are therefore internal, 
while the safety costs of vehicle weight are external. Consumers’ vehicle choices thus have 
the important features of an “arms race.” To date no detailed attempt has been made to 
quantify  the  external  costs  of  vehicle  weight.  This  figure  is  essential  for  determining  the 
socially optimal weight of the vehicle fleet, and it cannot be inferred from the net effects of 
average vehicle weight or fuel economy regulations on traffic safety. 
  We quantify the external costs of vehicle weight using a large micro data set on 
police-reported crashes for a set of 8 heterogeneous states. Unlike the data sets employed in 
the previous transportation literature or Jacobsen (2010), our data set includes both fatal and 
nonfatal accidents. Using unique vehicle identifiers (VINs), we determine the curb weight of 
each vehicle involved in an accident, thereby minimizing concerns about attenuation bias 
induced by measurement error. The rich set of vehicle, person, and accident observables in 
the data set allow us to minimize concerns about omitted variables bias. Using these data, we 
estimate the external effects of vehicle weight on fatalities and serious injuries conditional on 
a collision occurring. 
Two key results emerge from our estimates. First, we show that vehicle weight is a 
critical determinant of fatalities in other vehicles in the event of a multivehicle collision; our 
preferred estimate implies that a 1,000 pound increase in striking vehicle weight raises the 
probability  of  a  fatality  in  the  struck  vehicle  by  47%.  When  we  translate  this  higher 
probability of a fatality into external costs (relative to a small baseline vehicle), the total 
external costs of vehicle weight from fatalities alone are estimated at $93 billion per year. 
Second, by separately controlling for vehicle weight and whether the striking vehicle is a light 
truck  (i.e.,  a  pickup  truck,  sport  utility  vehicle,  or  minivan),  we  show  that  light  trucks 
significantly raise the probability of a fatality in the struck car – in addition to the effect of 
their already higher vehicle weight. 
Our unique data set allows us to condition on a collision occurring and thus ensures 
that our results cannot be generated by differences in collision rates between drivers of 
lighter and heavier vehicles. Nevertheless, driver selection could bias our results if drivers of 
                                                                                                                                               
deaths per year. Jacobsen does not attempt to estimate the causal effect of vehicle weight on fatalities in other 
vehicles, which is the focus of this paper.  
 
  4 
heavy vehicles have a tendency towards severe accidents. We rule out this possibility through 
three tests. First, we show that vehicle weight does not predict fatalities when two vehicles of 
equal weight collide. This suggests that drivers of heavy vehicles are not predisposed towards 
severe  accidents.  Second,  we  show  that  our  estimates  persist  even  when  controlling  for 
specific vehicle type via make and model fixed effects. Finally, we instrument for striking 
vehicle weight using the number of occupants in the striking vehicle and find estimates that 
are close to our least squares estimates. All three tests suggest that we successfully identify 
the causal effect of vehicle weight on the probability of fatalities in two-car collisions. 
One way to internalize the externality that we identify is through a weight varying 
mileage tax. However, such a tax could be logistically difficult to implement. We apply our 
estimates to consider whether a simple gasoline tax could be an alternative to internalize 
most of the external costs and conclude that it could. Our calculations suggest that the level 
of the optimal gasoline tax is substantially higher than previously estimated (e.g. Parry and 
Small 2005) and that the external traffic fatality costs of vehicle weight eclipse any other 
vehicle-related externality (Portney, Parry, Gruenspecht and Harrington, 2003). 
  The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  analytic  and  empirical 
framework and discusses the previous literature. Section 3 details the data, and Section 4 
presents the main results. Section 5 presents falsification tests and alternative sources of 
identification to check whether selection bias contaminates our results. Section 6 links the 
results to energy policy implications, focusing in particular on the gasoline tax. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2.  ANALYTIC AND EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
  Consumers’  vehicle  choices  represent  a  classic  example  of  an  externality  driven 
“arms race.” Purchasing a heavier vehicle enhances safety for each individual, but also makes 
other roadway users less safe. The net benefit of vehicle weight on traffic fatalities is thus 
smaller than the private benefit of vehicle weight on traffic fatalities, and consumers are 
incentivized to purchase heavier vehicles than is socially optimal. 
Figure 1 presents a stylized plot of the marginal private and social costs per mile of 
driving a heavier vehicle against the marginal private benefit per mile of driving a heavier 
vehicle. The marginal private cost of a heavier vehicle is positive due to the higher use of  
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inputs to produce heavier vehicles (e.g. more steel, bigger tires, etc.) and the lower fuel 
efficiency of heavier vehicles. The marginal private benefit of a heavier vehicle is positive but 
decreasing in vehicle weight – heavier vehicles provide increased protection in a collision and 
more cargo capacity, but as size increases the vehicle becomes increasingly difficult to park 
and handle.
4 The consumer equates marginal private cost and marginal private benefit and 
buys a vehicle weighing W* pounds. The private operating cost per mile is P*. However, a 
heavier vehicle may impose a cost on other roadway users in the form of increased risk of 
fatalities in a collision with this vehicle, and the driver does not bear this external cost. If 
external costs increase linearly in vehicle weight, as we show is approximately the case, the 
social marginal cost curve lies above the private marginal cost curve by a fixed amount equal 
to the external per mile cost. To maximize social welfare, our stylized consumer should 
purchase a car weighing W** pounds, where W** < W*. The necessary per-mile tax to 
induce this behavior is the marginal external cost of vehicle weight, t*. If the consumer 
chooses a vehicle of weight W*, the external cost from this choice over the socially optimal 
choice of a vehicle weighing W** would be t*·(W**–W*). We calculate this individual cost in 
Section 6 and aggregate it across all individuals to arrive at the total external costs. 
  It is important to note that the primary costs of this “arms race” accrue not in the 
form of traffic fatalities – which on net may change little with a reduction in fleet weight – 
but rather in the form of purchases of larger vehicles that are more expensive to construct 
and operate. In this sense it is similar to a conventional arms race, which need not increase 
the probability of conflict even as both countries spend large amounts on new weapons.
5 
  In principle, liability rules and insurance regulations could internalize many of the 
external costs due to vehicle weight. If drivers of heavy vehicles know that they will be held 
liable for deaths in other vehicles, then they should take these risks into account when 
purchasing their own vehicles. If insurance companies understand that heavier vehicles pose 
more danger to other roadway users, then they should charge higher liability premiums to 
drivers of heavy vehicles. In practice, however, liability rules and insurance regulations fail to 
internalize the fatality risks generated by heavy vehicles. 
                                                 
4 At some point the marginal private benefits of weight become negative. For example, few drivers would want 
a  30  foot  stretch  limousine  as  their  primary  vehicle,  even  if  it  were  luxuriously  appointed  and  heavily 
subsidized. 
5 Another example is the decision of a stadium spectator to sit or stand. If everyone stands, the average view is 
no better or worse than if everyone sits, but all spectators are less comfortable.  
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  Tort liability rules are inadequate to internalize fatality risks for two reasons. First, 
liability only applies in cases in which a driver behaves in a negligent manner (White 2004). 
This implies that the driver of any given vehicle will not always be liable in the event of a 
multivehicle  accident.  Second,  even  if  found  liable,  few  drivers  possess  assets  that  are 
sufficient to cover the cost of a fatality. The value of a statistical life (VSL) used by the 
United States Department of Transportation in cost-benefit analyses is $5.8 million (2008 
dollars), but only 7% of families in the United States had a net worth exceeding $1 million in 
2001 (Kennickell 2003). 
  Though few drivers can cover the cost of a fatality, liability insurance regulations 
could force most drivers to pay the expected liability costs of operating their vehicles. Again, 
however, the mandated levels of liability insurance are inadequate to cover the costs of a 
fatality. Two states (Florida and New Hampshire) do not require drivers to carry any liability 
coverage at all for injuries, and 44 states require drivers to carry $25,000 or less in liability 
coverage for each person injured. Only five states require more than $25,000 of liability 
coverage  for  each  person  injured  (Insurance  Information  Institute  2010).
6  Many  drivers 
remain  uninsured  despite  the  regulations,  and  even  drivers  who  carry  more  than  the 
mandated minimums rarely have policies that exceed several hundred thousand dollars of 
coverage. 
  While  liability  rules  and  insurance  regulations  cannot  internalize  the  majority  of 
fatality  costs,  they  may  internalize  a  significant  fraction  of  incapacitating  injury  costs. 
Estimates of the value of an incapacitating injury are far lower than the value of a statistical 
life, and it is plausible that insurance policies carried by many drivers could cover the costs 
of an incapacitating injury.
7 For this reason, our policy analysis focuses on external fatality 
costs and ignores external incapacitating injury costs. Accounting for injury costs would 
increase the magnitude of our results, but we cannot accurately estimate what fraction of 
injury costs are already internalized.
8 
                                                 
6 Minnesota and North Carolina each require $30,000 of liability coverage for each person injured, and Alaska, 
Maine, and Wisconsin each require $50,000 of liability coverage for each person injured. None of these states 
are in our data set. 
7 The National Safety Council, for example, estimates the comprehensive cost of an incapacitating injury at 
$214,000 (2008 dollars). In comparison, the council estimates the comprehensive cost of a fatality at $4.2 
million. 
8 The serious injury externality may be further mitigated by the fact that health insurers and the government pay 
for a portion of injury treatment costs. Drivers of heavy vehicles thus accrue a positive externality with respect 
to injuries that partially offsets the negative injury externality that they impose upon others.  
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  Previous work on the “arms race” on American roads has focused on the internal 
and external risks posed by the largest vehicles – pickup trucks and sport utility vehicles 
(SUVs) – relative to the typical passenger car. White (2004), Gayer (2004), Anderson (2008), 
and Li (forthcoming) all conclude that light trucks (pickups and SUVs) impose significant 
risks relative to passenger cars. This study expands upon that literature by considering the 
fundamental role that vehicle weight plays in determining external risk. We recognize that 
any vehicle that is heavier than the smallest feasible vehicle poses some external risk to other 
roadway users. We quantify that risk and find that the total external costs of vehicle weight 
substantially exceed the external costs that accrue only from light trucks. Our comprehensive 
results  span  the  entire  range  of  the  vehicle  fleet  and  allow  us  to  consider  the  broader 
implications of vehicle weight for energy policy. 
  To measure the effect of vehicle weight on external fatalities under ideal conditions, 
we  would  randomly  assign  vehicles  of  differing  weights  to  drivers  and  observe  external 
fatality  rates  by  vehicle  type.  Such  an  experiment  is  infeasible  in  practice,  and  even  an 
analogous study using observational data is impractical due to substantial measurement error 
in vehicle stocks and model-level vehicle miles traveled in most states. Instead, we focus on 
the  risk  of  a  fatality  conditional  on  a  collision  occurring.  A  key  assumption  when  we 
interpret our estimates in a policy context is that vehicle weight has no causal effect on the 
probability  of  a  collision.  We  discuss  this  assumption  below  and  conclude  that,  if  it  is 
violated, then the effect of vehicle weight on the probability of a collision is likely positive. 
Our estimates thus represent a lower bound on the effect of weight on external fatalities. 
  Consider the expected external fatalities for a vehicle of type i during time interval t. 
For simplicity, assume that t is short enough that the probability of multiple collisions during 
t is effectively zero. 
E fatalitiesit [ ]= E E fatalitiesit |collisionit [ ] ! " # $ = E fatalitiesit |collisionit [ ]%P collisionit =1 ( )    (1)   
Equation (1) must hold via the law of iterated expectations. It implies that if weight 
has no causal effect on the probability of a collision, then the total effect of weight on 
external fatalities is proportional to the effect of weight on external fatalities conditional on a 
collision occurring. Weight may affect the probability of a collision in two ways, however. 
First,  from  an  engineering  perspective,  heavier  vehicles  are  less  maneuverable  and  have 
longer  braking  distances.  Even  if  driver  behavior  is  unchanged,  heavier  vehicles  may  
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therefore get into more accidents. Second, heavier vehicles may also affect driver behavior. 
On the margin, drivers may respond to the internal safety benefits of heavy vehicles by 
increasing their optimal collision rate (Peltzman 1975). Both the physical characteristics of 
heavier  vehicles  and  the  potential  driver  response  to  heavier  vehicles  could  therefore 
generate a positive effect of vehicle weight on collision rates.
9 
  Empirical  evidence  also  suggests  that,  if  anything,  heavier  vehicles  have  higher 
collision rates than lighter vehicles. Evans (1984) examines the relationship between accident 
rates  and  vehicle  weight  using  accident  data  and  vehicle  registration  data  from  North 
Carolina, New York, and Michigan. He finds that, after conditioning on driver age, 4,000 
pound vehicles have accident rates that are 39% higher than 2,000 pound vehicles. More 
recently, White (2004) and Anderson (2008) estimate that light trucks are 13% to 45% more 
likely  to  experience  multivehicle  collisions  than  passenger  cars.  Of  course,  some  of  the 
observed differences in crash rates may be due to driver selection; careless drivers may 
choose  heavier  vehicles.  Nevertheless,  both  theory  and  empirical  evidence  suggest  that 
weight may directly increase the probability of experiencing a collision. We thus interpret our 
estimates – which are conditional on a collision occurring – as lower bounds on the causal 
effect of weight on external fatalities.
10 
 
3.  DATA 
 
  The data set consists of the population of police-reported accidents for eight states: 
Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Ohio, Washington and Wyoming. These 
data come from the State Data System, maintained by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA). We obtained permission from the head of each state’s police 
force to use the data. The SDS data include information on injuries and fatalities, geographic 
                                                 
9 To the best of our knowledge, the only factor that might reduce the probability of a collision for heavier 
vehicles is visibility. Larger vehicles provide their drivers with a better view of the road ahead, which may 
decrease the probability of an accident. However, they also make it more difficult for drivers behind them to 
see ahead, which may increase the probability of an accident. The net impact of these two effects is unclear, but 
the resulting dynamic is again an example of an arms race – the visibility benefits are internal while the visibility 
costs are external. Visibility would thus be another reason to tax larger vehicles more than smaller vehicles. 
10 Note that the concern here is whether weight has a causal effect on collision probabilities. This concern arises 
because we consider the policy implications of inducing some drivers to switch to lighter vehicles via a tax. This 
exogenous manipulation of vehicle choice will affect collision probabilities only if vehicle weight has a causal 
effect on collision probabilities. Weight may also be correlated with the type of driver, which could generate 
selection bias in our regressions. We consider this issue separately in Section 5.  
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location,  weather  conditions,  use  of  safety  equipment,  and  driver  and  occupant 
characteristics. We selected these eight states out of the 32 states currently participating in 
the SDS as they report the vehicle identification number (VIN) for the majority of vehicles 
in the data set. We purchased data tables from DataOne Software to match the first 9 digits 
of the VIN to curb weight data for each vehicle. We therefore observe curbside vehicle 
weight for approximately 64% of the vehicles in our data set (we confirm in Section 4 that 
the missing weight data do not appear to bias our estimates). For analytic purposes, we 
decompose the data set into three sub-samples, two-vehicle crashes, three-vehicle crashes, 
and  single-vehicle  crashes.  The  two-vehicle  crash  data  set  is  the  focus  of  most  of  our 
analyses. It contains 4.8 million vehicles in collisions in which both vehicles have complete 
curbside weight data.
11 
  One important feature of the SDS data is that accidents only appear in the data set if 
the police take an accident report. According to NHTSA documentation, various estimates 
suggest that only half of all motor vehicle accidents are police reported. While many of the 
unreported accidents are single vehicle accidents, some no doubt involve two vehicles as 
well. This sampling frame could affect our estimates if vehicle weight affects the probability 
of a police report, all other factors held constant. Serious multivehicle accidents are always 
reported  to  the  police  regardless  of  vehicle  weight,  but  vehicle  weight  could  affect  the 
probability  that  a  minor  accident  is  reported  to  the  police.  Unlike  the  probability  of  a 
collision, there is no a priori reason to believe that vehicle weight must have a positive effect 
on the probability of a police report. On the one hand, collisions involving heavier vehicles 
cause more property damage, all other factors held constant, because more kinetic energy 
must be dissipated through deformation of materials. On the other hand, some heavier 
vehicles, such as pickup trucks, are more likely to be involved in rugged work. These trucks 
may  have  accumulated  more  dents,  reducing  the  likelihood  that  the  owners  will  report 
property damage from a minor accident. 
  If vehicle weight positively affects the reporting probability of minor accidents, then 
our estimates will represent a lower bound on the effect of weight on external fatalities. If 
vehicle weight negatively affects the reporting probability of minor accidents, however, then 
                                                 
11 The data set contains the population of police reported accidents for Florida (1989-2005), Kansas (2001-
2005), Kentucky (1998-2005), Maryland (1989-1999), Missouri (1989-2005), Ohio (1991-2005), Washington 
(2002-2005), and Wyoming (1998-2005).  
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our estimates of the effect of weight on external fatalities could be upwardly biased. To test 
whether the “ruggedness” hypothesis affects our results, we estimate our regressions while 
limiting the sample to collisions that do not involve any light trucks. This sample restriction 
does not reduce the coefficient estimates.
12 We also conduct a series of falsification tests in 
Section 5 that imply that the sampling frame does not bias our results. 
  Table 1 presents summary statistics from our two-vehicle collision data set. This data 
set contains all collisions involving two light vehicles built after 1980. We define a light 
vehicle as any car, pickup truck, SUV, or minivan that weighs between 1,500 and 6,000 
pounds. We exclude collisions involving heavy trucks. The first two columns report statistics 
for the entire two-vehicle collision data set. The mean vehicle weight in this data set is 3,076 
pounds, and approximately 24.5% of vehicles are light trucks (pickups, SUVs, or minivans). 
The average model year is 1992, and the average number of occupants per vehicle is 1.41. 
The probability of a fatality in each vehicle is 0.19% (i.e., 0.0019), and the probability of a 
serious injury in each vehicle is 2.7%. Alcohol is involved in 8.3% of collisions. 
  The last two columns of Table 1 report summary statistics for the estimation sample 
with  complete  covariates.  This  sample  is  smaller  than  the  overall  two-vehicle  collision 
sample  because  we  drop  collisions  in  which  any  of  the  covariates  from  our  preferred 
specification are missing. This restriction reduces the sample from 4.8 million observations 
to  2.8  million  observations.  Nevertheless,  the  two  samples  appear  similar  along  most 
observable measures. 
 
4.  SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS 
 
  Consider a collision involving two vehicles, Vehicle 1 and Vehicle 2. Suppose that we 
label Vehicle 1 as the “struck vehicle” and Vehicle 2 as the “striking vehicle.” These labels 
are for expositional purposes only – they do not signify which vehicle may be at fault in the 
collision.
13 The external effects of vehicle weight are given by the effect of striking vehicle 
weight on the probability of fatalities in the struck vehicle. The internal effects of vehicle 
                                                 
12 In the sample that excludes all collisions involving light trucks, the estimated effects are of similar magnitude 
to the analogous estimates from the main sample, reported in Table 2. This implies that the “ruggedness” 
hypothesis is not upwardly biasing our main results (see online Appendix Table A1). 
13 The labels are symmetric in that each vehicle enters our data set twice, once as the striking vehicle and once 
as the struck vehicle.  
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weight are given by the effect of struck vehicle weight on the probability of fatalities in the 
struck vehicle. The former is the quantity of policy interest, but we report results for the 
latter as well for comparison purposes. 
  We  estimate  the  conditional  expectation  of  a  fatality  in  the  struck  vehicle  as  a 
function of striking vehicle weight, struck vehicle weight, and a rich set of covariates. We 
estimate the conditional expectation function (CEF) using either a linear probability model 
(LPM) or a probit.
14 For robustness, we report estimates for both models. 
  We specify the linear probability model as follows: 
 
E struck veh fatalityi |striking veh weighti, struck veh weighti, X1i, X2i, Wi [ ]                     (2) 
  = !1striking veh weighti + !2struck veh weighti + X1i"1 + X2i"2 +Wi"3 
 
  In  equation  (2),  !1  represents  the  coefficient  of  interest,  X1i  represents  a  set  of 
characteristics  pertaining  to  the  striking  vehicle  in  collision  i,  X2i  represents  a  set  of 
characteristics  pertaining  to  the  struck  vehicle  in  collision  i,  and  Wi  represents  a  set  of 
characteristics common to both vehicles in collision i. The probit model modifies equation 
(2) as follows: 
 
E struck veh fatalityi | striking veh weighti, struck veh weighti, X1i, X2i, Wi [ ]                     (3) 
  = ! "1striking veh weighti +"2struck veh weighti + X1i# 1 + X2i# 2 +Wi# 3 ( ) 
 
  In equation (3), the link function ! is the normal CDF. Therefore, the marginal 
effect of striking vehicle weight varies with striking vehicle weight. For comparability with 
the LPM results, for each probit regression we report the average marginal effect across all 
observations included in that regression.
15 
                                                 
14  The  LPM  cannot  literally  be  true.  Nevertheless,  it  provides  the  minimum  mean  squared  error  linear 
approximation to the true CEF, and in our case the LPM coefficients are always close to the corresponding 
average marginal effects from the probit models. 
15 Some of our probit regressions include fixed effects, raising the possibility of inconsistency due to the 
incidental parameters problem. However, in most cases we have many observations for each fixed effect, and 
as shown in Fernandez-Val (2009), the incidental parameters problem generates a trivial degree of bias in the 
probit model when estimating marginal effects (which are our quantities of interest).  
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  Table 2 presents results from estimating equations (2) and (3) on the two-vehicle 
collision data set. The sample includes all accidents for which there is complete vehicle 
weight data for both vehicles; analyses restricted to states with low rates of missing weight 
data suggest that this constraint does not bias our results.
16 Each vehicle appears in the two-
vehicle collision data set twice, once as the struck vehicle and once as the striking vehicle. 
We therefore cluster the standard errors at the collision level to account for correlation 
between observations that pertain to the same collision. 
  The first and second columns in Table 2 include the following covariates: vehicle 
weight, light truck indicators, and year fixed effects. A striking vehicle and struck vehicle 
version of each of the first two variables is included. The first column implies that a 1,000 
pound increase in weight in the striking vehicle is associated with a statistically significant 
0.09 percentage point increase in the probability of a fatality in the struck vehicle (t = 22.0). 
This coefficient represents a 46% increase over the average probability of a fatality in a 
struck vehicle in this sample (0.19%). In comparison, a 1,000 pound increase in weight in the 
struck vehicle is associated with a smaller 0.05 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
a fatality in the struck vehicle (t = –11.8). Light trucks increase the probability of a fatality in 
the  struck  vehicle  by  0.12  percentage  points  (62%  of  the  sample  mean),  even  after 
controlling  for  striking  vehicle  weight  (t  =  19.5).  The  results  from  the  probit  model  in 
column (2) display z-statistics that are similar to the t-statistics in column (1), and the average 
marginal effect generated by the probit model is of similar magnitude to the LPM coefficient 
(0.08 percentage points versus 0.09 percentage points). 
  Subsequent columns in Table 2 add additional covariates to the regressions. Columns 
(3) and (4) add controls for rain, darkness, day of week (weekday versus weekend), interstate 
highway, a quadratic in model year for each vehicle, and year, hour, and county fixed effects. 
The estimated effect of striking vehicle weight changes little in both the LPM and probit 
models. Columns (5) and (6) add controls for any seat belt usage, a quadratic in driver age, 
indicators for drivers under 21 or over 60, and indicators for male drivers or young male 
                                                 
16 Weight data are missing for vehicles for which we do not have VINs. The percentage of vehicles with 
missing weight data ranges from 17.4% (Ohio) to 54.5% (Maryland). When estimating our main statistical 
models on the four states with the lowest rates of missing weight data (Kentucky, Ohio, Washington, and 
Wyoming), we find that an additional 1,000 pounds of striking vehicle weight increases the probability of a 
fatality in the struck vehicle by 46% to 51%. When estimating the same models on the four states with highest 
rates of missing weight data (Florida, Kansas, Maryland, and Missouri), we find that an additional 1,000 pounds 
of striking vehicle weight increases the probability of a fatality in the struck vehicle by 44%. The rate of missing 
weight data thus appears to have little impact on our estimates (see online Appendix Table A2).  
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drivers. A striking vehicle and struck vehicle version of each of these variables is included. 
The inclusion of these driver characteristics has minimal impact on the primary coefficient 
of interest (striking vehicle weight). They do, however, increase the magnitude of the struck 
vehicle weight coefficient to –0.10 percentage points (t = –20.2). 
  Column (7) of Table 2 adds city fixed effects and is our preferred specification. City 
fixed  effects  should  absorb  any  geographic  heterogeneity  in  fatality  rates  that  could  be 
correlated with average vehicle weight. This issue would arise if, for example, heavy vehicles 
clustered  in  rural  areas  and  these  areas  had  deadlier  accidents  due  to  a  prevalence  of 
undivided highways or a sparseness of hospitals. At this point there are too many regressors 
to reliably estimate a probit model, and for many cities the city fixed effect perfectly predicts 
the fatality indicator, forcing the city to be dropped. We thus estimate only linear probability 
models in columns (7) through (9) of Table 2. The addition of city fixed effects has little 
impact on the coefficient on striking vehicle weight, changing it from 0.10 percentage points 
to 0.11 percentage points (t = 18.3). This coefficient represents a 47% increase over the 
average probability of a fatality in a struck vehicle in this sample. Column (8) estimates the 
same specification as column (7) but limits the sample to observations for which we have 
data on the number of occupants per vehicle and the seat belt usage of each occupant (two 
controls we add in the next column). This restriction shrinks the sample in half and reduces 
the coefficient on striking vehicle weight to 0.07 percentage points (t = 10.8). However, the 
ratio of the coefficient to the average fatality rate in the sample remains stable (49%). The 
change in the coefficient simply reflects the fact that the restricted sample contains states 
with a lower threshold for reporting accidents, and thus a lower fatality rate per reported 
accident. Column (9) adds controls for the number of occupants per vehicle and seat belt 
usage rate of these occupants. The coefficient on striking vehicle weight is unchanged from 
column (8). 
  The results in Table 2 suggest that selection bias has little impact on the striking 
vehicle weight coefficient but may affect the struck vehicle weight coefficient. In particular, 
the addition of driver characteristic controls in columns (5) and (6) has a notable impact on 
the struck vehicle weight coefficient but almost no impact on the striking vehicle weight 
coefficient. When adding covariates one at a time, we find that virtually all of the change in 
the struck vehicle weight coefficient between columns (4) and (6) can be attributed to the 
addition of the controls for driver age. The patterns strongly suggest that older drivers tend  
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to drive heavier vehicles and that older drivers are more susceptible to dying in crashes. 
Since there is little correlation between the age of the struck vehicle’s driver and the weight 
of the striking vehicle, however, the addition of driver age controls has no impact on the 
striking vehicle weight coefficient. Stated simply, heavy vehicles do not “seek out” elderly 
drivers to crash into. 
  The results in Table 2 also suggest that the external risk posed by light trucks is not 
due solely to their heavy weight. The coefficient on the indicator for whether the striking 
vehicle  is  a  light  truck  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  in  every  column.  In  our 
preferred specification, column (7), the coefficient implies that being struck by a light truck 
increases  the  probability  of  a  fatality  by  0.09  percentage  points  (t  =  10.3),  even  after 
conditioning on striking vehicle weight. This represents a 40% increase over the average 
fatality rate in the sample. In comparison, if we do not control for vehicle weight, then the 
light truck coefficient doubles to 0.18 percentage points (i.e., 0.0018).
17 The additional risk 
posed  by  light  trucks  may  be  due  to  the  stiffness  of  their  frames  or  their  height 
incompatibility with other vehicles (Hakim 2003). However, the robustness tests that we 
perform  in  Section  5  for  the  vehicle  weight  coefficient  do  not  apply  to  the  light  truck 
coefficient.  Thus  we  cannot  rule  out  the  possibility  that  a  portion  of  the  light  truck 
coefficient may represent driver selection effects – i.e., consumers that purchase light trucks 
may  drive  in  an  aggressive  manner  that  generates  particularly  severe  collisions.  For  this 
reason we do not incorporate the light truck coefficient when calculating the total externality 
across all vehicles in Section 6. If we were to incorporate the light truck coefficient, the total 
externality  would  be  even  larger.  In  the  context  of  CAFE  standards,  however,  we  do 
consider the potential risks that light trucks pose 
  Table 3 presents results from estimating versions of equations (2) and (3) in which 
the  dependent  variable  is  the  presence  of  serious  injuries  in  the  struck  vehicle.  The 
regressions are analogous to those in Table 2, but the dependent variable has changed from 
any fatalities to any serious injuries. The striking vehicle weight coefficients (or marginal 
effects, in the case of probit regressions) in Table 3 are approximately 6 times larger than the 
corresponding coefficients in Table 2. This difference arises because the probability of a 
                                                 
17 The 0.18 percentage point coefficient represents 77% of the average fatality rate in the sample. This effect is 
roughly similar in magnitude to the external effects of light trucks in two-vehicle collisions that White (2004) 
and  Anderson  (2008)  estimate.  Anderson  (2008),  for  example,  estimates  that  light  trucks  increase  the 
probability of a fatality in the struck vehicle by approximately 60% of the sample average fatality rate.  
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serious  injury  in  this  sample  is  approximately  15  times  higher  than  the  probability  of  a 
fatality. In the preferred specification, column (7), a 1,000 pound increase in striking vehicle 
weight raises the probability of serious injuries in the struck vehicle by 0.7 percentage points 
(t = 32.7). This figure represents 20% of the average probability of a serious injury in this 
sample. 
  Overall, the pattern of coefficients in Table 3 is similar to the pattern of coefficients 
in Table 2, with one exception. When the dependent variable is the presence of serious 
injuries (Table 3), the magnitude of the struck vehicle weight coefficient is larger than the 
magnitude  of  the  striking  vehicle  weight  coefficient.  For  example,  in  the  preferred 
specification the striking vehicle weight coefficient is 0.7 percentage points, while the struck 
vehicle weight coefficient is –0.9 percentage points. This contrasts with Table 2, in which the 
magnitude of the struck vehicle weight coefficient is generally smaller than the magnitude of 
the striking vehicle weight coefficient. Since the proportion of serious injuries that represent 
external costs is ambiguous, we focus on fatalities for the remainder of the paper. 
  Table 4 presents results testing for heterogeneity in the effect of striking vehicle 
weight on fatalities. In column (1), we add a quadratic term in striking vehicle weight. The 
coefficient on the quadratic term is zero, suggesting that the relationship between striking 
vehicle weight and fatalities is approximately linear. Column (2) adds an interaction between 
striking  vehicle  weight  and  struck  vehicle  weight.  The  average  effect  of  striking  vehicle 
weight (calculated across all observations) is unchanged, but the interaction term is negative 
and  statistically  significant,  suggesting  that  striking  vehicle  weight  has  a  smaller  absolute 
impact (but similar percentage impact) when the struck vehicle is heavier.
18 Nevertheless, 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the marginal effect of weight remains constant across the range 
of striking vehicle weights. Figure 2 plots the estimated marginal effects of striking vehicle 
weight for six models: linear OLS, quadratic OLS, quadratic OLS with an interaction term, 
linear probit, quadratic probit, and quadratic probit with an interaction term.
19 The marginal 
effects of all three OLS models – linear OLS, quadratic OLS, and quadratic OLS with an 
interaction term – are virtually identical across the range of striking vehicle weights. Given 
                                                 
18 Struck vehicle weight is normalized to have a mean of zero in the interaction term. The interaction effect is 
thus equal to zero when the struck vehicle is of average weight. 
19 The “linear probit” is a model in which there are no higher order terms of striking vehicle weight. It is not 
literally a linear model. The “quadratic probit” is a model in which both striking vehicle weight and the square 
of striking vehicle weight appear on the right-hand side, and the “quadratic probit with an interaction” adds the 
interaction between striking vehicle weight and struck vehicle weight.  
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the significant interaction term in Table 4, this trend suggests that the weight of the struck 
vehicle is not strongly correlated with the weight of the striking vehicle. 
  Columns (3) and (4) replicate columns (1) and (2) but are estimated using the probit 
model instead of the LPM. When using the probit model, the quadratic weight term is highly 
significant, suggesting non-linear effects from striking vehicle weight. In fact, the opposite is 
true. The probit is an inherently non-linear model that forces the marginal effect of vehicle 
weight  to  increase  in  accidents  that  involve  heavier  striking  vehicles.
20  Including  the 
quadratic weight term allows the regression to offset this increase, and the resulting function 
is much closer to a linear function. Figure 2 demonstrates this fact. The marginal effects of 
the  quadratic  probit,  the  quadratic  probit  with  an  interaction  term,  and  all  of  the  OLS 
models are roughly similar, particularly between 2,400 to 4,500 pounds of vehicle weight (a 
range which includes over 80% of the vehicles in our sample). In contrast, the marginal 
effects of the linear probit model diverge substantially from the marginal effects of the other 
five models. Since both the flexible OLS and flexible probit models suggest that the true 
CEF  is  approximately  linear  in  striking  vehicle  weight,  and  because  the  probit  cannot 
accommodate city level fixed effects, we focus on linear probability models in much of the 
remaining analysis.
21 
Though 90% of multivehicle collisions involve two vehicles, nine percent involve 
three vehicles, and one percent involve four or more vehicles. Adding 1,000 pounds to a 
vehicle in a three-vehicle collision should increase the risk of a fatality in the other two 
vehicles by less than 47% each (our preferred estimate from the two-vehicle collision data 
set). This attenuation occurs because the extra mass of the first vehicle is now distributed 
across  two  other  vehicles  rather  than  one  other  vehicle.  We  estimate  the  relationship 
between vehicle weight and fatalities in three-vehicle collisions in Table 5. For expositional 
purposes, assume that Vehicle 1 is the struck vehicle and that Vehicles 2 and 3 are the 
striking vehicles. In Table 5, the striking vehicle weight coefficient represents the average 
                                                 
20 The probit marginal effect equals !(X")!", where !(!) represents the standard normal density function. 
Since the probability of a fatality is less than 50%, !(X") is increasing in  X! . The marginal effect of striking 
vehicle weight thus increases in striking vehicle weight. The rate of increase is substantial since the effect of 
striking vehicle weight is large. 
21 For simplicity, we assume a linear effect of striking vehicle weight when comparing a gasoline tax to a weight 
varying mileage tax in Section 6. This assumption is conservative in that the fit between the gasoline tax and the 
weight varying mileage tax improves if the true marginal effects decrease for vehicles below 2,400 lbs and 
above 4,500 lbs, as suggested by the quadratic probit or the quadratic probit with an interaction term.  
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effect of a 1,000 pound increase in the weight of either Vehicle 2 or 3 (but not both) on the 
probability of a fatality in Vehicle 1. The striking vehicle weight coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant in all specifications, and the magnitude of the coefficient ranges from 
28% to 42% of the average probability of a fatality. Our preferred estimate, column (7), 
implies that a 1,000 pound increase in one vehicle raises the probability of a fatality in either 
of the other two vehicles by 35%. 
 
5.  FALSIFICATION TESTS AND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF IDENTIFICATION 
 
  The results in Section 4 demonstrate a strong relationship between striking vehicle 
weight and struck vehicle fatalities. The robustness of this relationship to the inclusion of a 
rich set of accident and driver characteristics, as well as very fine geographic fixed effects, 
suggests that the striking vehicle weight coefficients represent causal effects of weight on 
fatality risk. However, two potential sources of upward bias seem particularly plausible. First, 
driver selection may bias the coefficient estimates if heavier vehicles attract aggressive drivers 
who get into deadlier accidents. Note, however, that only selection of drivers who get into 
deadlier  accidents,  rather  than  drivers  who  get  into  more  accidents,  could  bias  our 
estimates.
22  Second,  the  sampling  frame  might  bias  the  coefficient  estimates  if  minor 
collisions involving heavier vehicles are less likely to be reported to the police, all other 
factors held constant.
23 To test whether either of these factors could bias our results, we 
conduct three exercises. First, we implement a series of falsification tests that we benchmark 
against engineering safety estimates. Second, we estimate the effect of striking vehicle weight 
on  fatalities  using  within-model  changes  in  vehicle  weight  that  occur  when  models  are 
refreshed. Finally, we estimate the effect of striking vehicle weight on fatalities using striking 
vehicle occupants as an instrument for weight. 
                                                 
22 Because our estimates are conditional on a collision occurring, only specific types of driver selection can 
generate bias. Selection of “careless” drivers who simply get into more accidents of the same expected severity 
would not bias our results. It would increase the number of times we observe these drivers in the sample, but it 
would not increase the probability that someone dies in a collision conditional on the collision occurring. 
Selection of “aggressive” drivers who get into more severe accidents could bias our results, however. These 
drivers could increase the probability that someone dies in a collision conditional on the collision occurring. 
23 Note that, unlike the struck vehicle weight coefficients, striking vehicle weight coefficients are unlikely to be 
biased by any correlation between vehicle weight and vehicle safety features. It is plausible that heavier vehicles 
may be more or less likely to have safety features such as airbags, side impact protection beams, and unibody 
construction. However, these safety features are much more helpful to the striking vehicle’s own occupants 
than they are to the occupants of other vehicles that the striking vehicle hits.  
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5.1  FALSIFICATION TESTS 
 
  Suppose that heavier vehicles pose no additional risk to other vehicles than lighter 
vehicles do, and that the estimates reported in Section 4 simply reflect the possibility that 
drivers of heavier vehicles are more aggressive (regardless of vehicle weight) or that heavier 
vehicles are less likely to generate police reports. In that case, there should be a strong 
positive correlation between vehicle weight and fatalities or injuries when analyzing two-
vehicle collisions between vehicles of the same weight. These accidents therefore provide an 
opportunity to test whether driver selection bias or sampling frame bias are generating our 
results. 
  It is possible, however, that heavier vehicles are safer than lighter vehicles. In that 
case, a positive driver selection effect might be mitigated by a negative weight effect. Put 
simply,  even  if  drivers  of  heavier  vehicles  drive  aggressively,  our  falsification  test  might 
generate  a  small  coefficient  because  the  heavier  vehicles  are  fundamentally  safer.  We 
therefore benchmark the results of our falsification tests against the results of NHTSA crash 
tests. NHTSA crash tests entail colliding a vehicle with a concrete barrier; they are meant to 
simulate the results of a collision with a stationary object or a head-on collision with another 
vehicle of similar weight. The primary outcome in the NHTSA crash test is the Head Injury 
Criterion (HIC). This variable is derived from an accelerometer mounted on the crash test 
dummy’s head and measures the forces that the head is exposed to. A higher HIC value 
corresponds to a higher probability of severe or fatal head injury. 
  Table 6 presents results from regressions of HIC scores on vehicle weight using the 
NHTSA crash test data. All regressions include as controls a light truck indicator, a quadratic 
in vehicle model year, and a quadratic in collision speed. The estimation sample in the first 
two columns contains all NHTSA vehicle-to-barrier frontal crash tests conducted from 1980 
to 2009 (the average year is 1997). Column (1) reports regression results when the dependent 
variable is HIC. The results indicate that an additional 1,000 pounds of vehicle weight is 
associated with a statistically insignificant 3% increase in HIC (17.7 points). Column (2) 
reports  regression  results  when  the  dependent  variable  is  an  indicator  for  whether  HIC 
exceeds 700. This threshold is of interest because it represents the point at which there is a 
significant (5%) chance of severe brain injury (Mertz, Prasad, and Irwin 1997). The results  
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indicate that an additional 1,000 pounds of vehicle weight is associated with a statistically 
insignificant 8.7% increase in the probability that HIC exceeds 700 (2.4 percentage points). 
The composition of vehicles that NHTSA tests, however, is not identical to the composition 
of vehicles on the roadways. To account for this fact, we estimate regressions in which each 
test result is weighted by the sales share of the tested vehicle.
24 Columns (3) and (4) report 
the results from these regressions. The sample size falls because we do not have sales share 
data for every tested vehicle, but the results are qualitatively unchanged. An additional 1,000 
pounds of vehicle weight is associated with small, statistically insignificant increases in HIC 
or  the  probability  that  HIC  exceeds  700.  Overall,  there  is  a  weak  positive  relationship 
between vehicle weight and HIC values. The point estimates suggest that an additional 1,000 
pounds  of  vehicle  weight  could  raise  the  fatality  rate  by  3%  to  9%,  but  none  of  the 
coefficients are statistically significant. We thus expect a weak relationship between vehicle 
weight and fatalities in collisions between two equal weight vehicles if our research design is 
sound. 
Table 7 presents results from regressions in which the estimation sample consists of 
collisions involving two vehicles of similar weight – the difference in vehicle weight cannot 
exceed 200 pounds. In each regression, an indicator for fatalities in the struck vehicle is 
regressed  on  the  average  weight  of  the  two  vehicles  and  the  set  of  controls  from  our 
preferred specification. Column (1) indicates that an increase of 1,000 pounds in average 
vehicle weight predicts a statistically insignificant 2% decrease in the probability of a fatality 
(0.00 percentage points). Column (2) restricts the sample to head-on collisions between two 
vehicles of the same weight, the type of collision simulated by NHTSA. In this sample, an 
increase of 1,000 pounds in average vehicle weight predicts a statistically insignificant 19% 
decrease  in  the  probability  of  a  fatality  (0.11  percentage  points).
25  Columns  (3)  and  (4) 
replicate columns (1) and (2) but restrict the sample so that the difference in vehicle weight 
cannot  exceed  100  pounds.  The  estimates  remain  small  or  negative  and  statistically 
insignificant, but are less precisely estimated. 
  Overall, the estimates in Table 7 indicate that there is a weak relationship between 
vehicle  weight  and  fatalities  in  collisions  between  two  vehicles  of  equal  weight,  and  we 
                                                 
24 Vehicle sales share data come from Ward’s Automotive Yearbook. 
25 The average probability of a fatality is much higher in column (2) than in column (1) because head-on 
collisions are more dangerous than the average collision.  
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cannot reject the hypothesis that this relationship is zero. This finding is consistent with 
NHTSA crash test results (Table 6) and inconsistent with the hypothesis that driver selection 
bias or sampling frame bias is generating the results in Section 4. The most precise estimate 
in Table 7 – column (1) – suggests that increasing average vehicle weight by 1,000 pounds 
decreases the fatality rate by 2%. This figure is close to the range implied by the NHTSA 
crash test data. In contrast, if the relationship between striking vehicle weight and struck 
vehicle fatalities were generated by driver selection bias or sampling frame bias, then we 
would expect a large positive coefficient on average vehicle weight when two vehicles of 
equal weight collide. The preferred estimate from Section 4 indicates that a 1,000 pound 
increase in striking vehicle weight raises the probability of a fatality in the struck vehicle by 
47%. If this coefficient represented driver selection bias, and if two aggressive drivers were 
twice as dangerous as one aggressive driver, then we might expect a 1,000 pound increase in 
both vehicles weights to raise the probability of a fatality by 94% (2*47 = 94). However, no 
coefficient in Table 7 is above 2%. 
  As  an  additional  set  of  falsification  tests,  we  examine  the  relationship  between 
vehicle weight and fatalities in collisions involving a single vehicle. If drivers of heavier 
vehicles are more aggressive, then we expect a strong positive relationship between vehicle 
weight and fatalities in these collisions. Table 8 presents results for single-vehicle collisions. 
In these collisions, we regress a fatality indicator on vehicle weight and other controls. The 
results in column (1) pertain to all single-vehicle collisions; a 1,000 pound increase in vehicle 
weight  is  associated  with  a  3%  increase  in  the  probability  of  a  fatality  (0.04  percentage 
points).
26  Column  (2)  pertains  to  single-vehicle  frontal  collisions,  the  type  of  collision 
simulated by NHTSA. A 1,000 pound increase in vehicle weight is associated with a 2% 
increase in the probability of a fatality (0.03 percentage points). Columns (3) and (4) present 
results  that  are  analogous  to  columns  (1)  and  (2)  but  are  estimated  using  a  probit 
specification instead of a linear probability model. In both columns, a 1,000 pound increase 
in vehicle weight is associated with an increase of less than 1% in the probability of a fatality. 
In all columns, the percentage effects fall close to the range implied by the NHTSA crash 
test data, suggesting no substantial bias due to driver selection. 
                                                 
26 The raw magnitude of the coefficients is much larger in Table 8 than in Table 7 because the fatality rate in 
single-vehicle collisions is approximately 7 times higher than the fatality rate in two-vehicle collisions. This 
occurs because observed single-vehicle collisions tend to be more severe; drivers have no incentive to report 
minor single-vehicle collisions to their insurers or the police.  
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5.2  VEHICLE MODEL FIXED EFFECTS RESULTS 
 
To further establish the robustness of our results, we explore two alternative sources 
of identification. Our first alternative leverages within-model changes in vehicle weight to 
estimate the effect of striking vehicle weight on fatalities. To implement this design, we 
include vehicle model fixed effects for the striking vehicle in our preferred specification. The 
effect of striking vehicle weight on fatalities is thus identified on the basis of changes in 
vehicle weight that occur when a vehicle model is refreshed. This design minimizes the 
impact of driver selection as long as the composition of customers for a particular vehicle 
model remains relatively stable when the model is refreshed. 
Table  9  reports  estimates  from  models  that  include  vehicle  model  fixed  effects. 
Column (1) presents results from our preferred specification estimated on the sample for 
which we have complete vehicle model data. The sample size is substantially smaller than 
our  main  analytic  sample  because  only  four  states  –  Kentucky,  Maryland,  Ohio,  and 
Wyoming – report detailed vehicle model data. In this subsample, a 1,000 pound increase in 
striking vehicle weight is associated with a 47% increase in the probability of a fatality in the 
struck vehicle (0.06 percentage points, t = 7.3). This effect is consistent with the estimates 
from Section 4. Column (2) presents results from the same specification with vehicle model 
fixed effects added.
27 A 1,000 pound increase in striking vehicle weight is now associated 
with a 58% increase in the probability of a fatality in the struck vehicle (0.07 percentage 
points, t = 4.5). The correspondence between the two coefficient estimates suggests that 
driver selection does not seriously bias our results, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
both coefficients converge to the same value. 
   
5.3  INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES RESULTS 
 
Our second alternate source of identification leverages the number of occupants in 
the striking vehicle as an instrument for striking vehicle weight. The number of occupants in 
the striking vehicle directly affects total striking vehicle weight, so the first condition for an 
                                                 
27 Across the four states with detailed vehicle model data, there are 18,746 make-model combinations. Our 
specification thus includes 18,745 vehicle model fixed effects.  
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instrumental variable – that it be correlated with the regressor of interest – is satisfied. The 




struck veh fatalityi = !1striking veh added weight !
i +!2striking veh curb weighti +
                                  X1i" 1 + X2i" 2 +Wi" 3 + #i
       (4) 
 
In this regression,  striking veh added weighti !  equals the number of occupants in 
the striking vehicle multiplied by 164 pounds, which is the average weight of an additional 
occupant circa 2000.
28 The regression controls for the curb weight of each vehicle (i.e., 
vehicle  weight  absent  any  passengers  or  cargo)  as  well  as  all  the  covariates  from  our 
preferred  specification.  The  identification  thus  comes  from  variation  in  the  number  of 
occupants in the striking vehicle after controlling for the curb weight of the striking vehicle. 
This means that the identifying variation in the IV regression is orthogonal to the variation 
in curb weight that we use in Section 4. 
Nevertheless, it is not obvious that the number of occupants in the striking vehicle 
satisfies the second condition for an instrumental variable – that it be uncorrelated with any 
other  factors  that  affect  fatalities  in  the  struck  vehicle.  It  is  possible  that,  even  after 
controlling for vehicle curb weight and other characteristics, drivers who carry additional 
occupants in their vehicles drive more aggressively than drivers who do not carry additional 
occupants. If this were true, then our IV estimates would be biased upward. We thus do not 
interpret  our  IV  estimates  as  being  more  robust  than  our  OLS  estimates.  Instead,  we 
recognize that the identifying variation in the IV regression is orthogonal to the identifying 
variation  in  the  OLS  regression.  If  the  two  regressions  produce  similar  estimates,  this 
suggests that both are estimating causal effects. If the two regressions produce very different 
estimates, this suggests that one (or both) may be biased. 
                                                 
28 We calculate this figure as follows. First, for the subset of accidents for which we have detailed occupant 
characteristics, we tabulate the share of additional occupants that are male adults, female adults, male children, 
and female children. We find that 21.6% of additional occupants are male adults, 39.2% are female adults, 
19.2% are male children, and 20.0% are female children. Using national statistics on body weight by gender and 
age  we  then  compute  the  average  weight  of  an  additional  occupant  as  0.216*190  lbs  +  0.392*163  lbs  + 
0.192*110 lbs + 0.200*114 lbs = 149 lbs (Ogden et al. 2004). Finally, we add 15 lbs per occupant to account 
for clothing, outerwear, and personal belongings (149 lbs + 15 lbs = 164 lbs).  
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The last two columns of Table 9 report coefficients from the instrumental variables 
sample. The IV sample is approximately half the size of our main analytic sample because 
data on the number of occupants is not available in every state. Column (3) presents results 
from estimating the preferred OLS specification (column (7) of Table 2) on the IV sample. 
A 1,000 pound increase in striking vehicle weight is associated with a statistically significant 
0.064 percentage point increase in the probability of a fatality in the struck vehicle (t = 10.7). 
This coefficient represents a 48% increase over the average probability of a fatality in a 
struck vehicle, which is consistent with the results in Section 4. Column (4) presents results 
from the IV regression in equation (4). The reported coefficient is !1, the coefficient on 
predicted additional weight in the striking vehicle. An additional 1,000 pounds of occupant 
weight in the striking vehicle is associated with a statistically significant 0.062 percentage 
point increase in the probability of a fatality in the struck vehicle (t = 2.4). This coefficient 
represents a 46% increase over the average probability of a fatality in the struck vehicle and 
is almost identical to the coefficient in column (3). The correspondence between the OLS 
and IV results thus increases our confidence in both estimators. 
 
6.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
  The econometric evidence demonstrates that the impact of heavier striking vehicles 
on fatalities in struck vehicles is statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of an 
extensive set of vehicle, driver and accident covariates, estimation methods and identification 
strategies. Our estimates also scale to the national level. In a previous working paper, we 
estimated the same models using data from the NHTSA General Estimates System (GES). 
The GES is a random subsample of police reported accidents in all states. It thus has fewer 
observations,  but  greater  geographic  coverage,  than  our  merged  state  data  sets.  If  we 
estimate our preferred specification using GES data, we find that 1,000 pounds of additional 
vehicle  weight  increases  the  probability  of  a  fatality  by  40%  in  the  other  vehicle.  This 
estimate is statistically significant (t = 4.8) and similar in magnitude to our preferred estimate 
of  47%  from  the  state  data  sets.  We  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  both  estimates 
converge to the same value. 
We now explore whether the estimated causal effect of vehicle weight on fatalities is 
economically significant and compare two possible price based policies to distribute the  
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external costs across drivers. To quantify the magnitude of the external costs of increased 
vehicle  weight,  we  design  the  following  counterfactual  experiment.  We  consider  the 
externality at the individual level, whereby purchasing and driving a heavy vehicle increases 
the probability of a fatality in a collision with other vehicles on the road. We conduct a 
thought experiment in which an individual chooses a vehicle of a certain weight; we then 
calculate the external costs from this individual’s vehicle choice. We carry out this calculation 
for each driver on the road while holding the remainder of the fleet constant. We sum across 
individuals to get the total externality from all individuals’ vehicle choices. 
For the purposes of this calculation, we assume that the individual chooses a vehicle 
weighing as much as the average 2005 model year vehicle in our data (3,616 pounds).
29 We 
calculate total external costs against two baseline vehicles that the individual could buy – a 
slightly lighter vehicle and the lightest possible vehicle. The “slightly lighter” counterfactual 
vehicle is a proxy for the average 1989 model year vehicle in our data, which weighs 2,953 
pounds. The “lightest possible” counterfactual vehicle is the smallest drivable car in mass 
production  in  2005,  which  weighs  1,850  pounds.  In  addition,  we  run  a  scenario  that 
incorporates the external costs from pedestrian and motorcycle fatalities. All of our scenarios 
represent partial equilibrium approaches to arriving at total external costs – they assume that 
our regression estimates would not change if the vehicle fleet changed in response to the 
policies considered (in reality, there could be a modest change in the regression coefficients 
if the vehicle fleet changes in response to policy). Constructing a general equilibrium model 
is beyond the scope of this paper, and we restrict ourselves to providing estimates of the 
total external costs in the context of the current vehicle fleet. 
  We assume the individual purchases a vehicle weighing 3,616 lbs, or the mean weight 
of  2005  model  year  vehicles  in  our  sample.  The  first  counterfactual  vehicle  that  the 
individual could have purchased weighs 2,953 pounds, or the mean weight of 1989 model 
year vehicles in our sample. From 1989 to 2005, the average model sold gained 625 pounds, 
with heterogeneity in weight gain by model. During this period the Honda Civic gained 457 
pounds, the Toyota Camry gained 515 pounds, and the Ford Explorer gained 490 pounds. 
The Honda Odyssey, a premier minivan, gained 1,060 pounds. Honda’s smallest compact 
                                                 
29 We calculate the average weight across all 2005 (or 1989) model year cars and light trucks weighing less than 
6,000 lbs in our eight state accident database.  
 
  25 
car, the 2010 Honda Fit, weighs 360 pounds more than the 1981 Accord, which is now a full 
size sedan. Similar patterns emerge for most other manufacturers. 
When summed across all individuals, our counterfactual scenario computes the total 
external cost of a 2005 model year vehicle fleet over the representative 1989 model year 
vehicle. Our experiment is not affected by the specific distribution of vehicle weight within 
the fleet as the probability of a fatality is assumed linear in striking vehicle weight – the 
linearity ensures that mean vehicle weight is a sufficient statistic for our policy analysis. We 
choose 2005 as our cutoff year as many of the parameters necessary for our full simulation 
were only available until 2005. 
The change in the probability of an external fatality for an individual buying vehicle 
model i weighing wi over a lighter vehicle weighing wcf is given by: 
External Costi = ! "(wi # wcf )"P(accident)"VSL       (5) 
For  !  we  employ  our  preferred  estimate  of  the  causal  effect  of  weight  on  the 
probability of a fatality in an accident, or 0.110 percentage points for each additional 1,000 
lbs in striking vehicle weight.
30 In all experiments, we set wi at 3,616 pounds. We calculate the 
probability of a vehicle being involved in a multivehicle collision at 3.65% per year (NHTSA, 
2007).
31 We apply the DOT value of a statistical life of $5.8 million. 
If our simulated individual chooses a vehicle weighing 3,616 lbs (wi) instead of one 
weighing  2,953  lbs  (wcf),  she  causes  an  additional  0.000027  external  fatalities  per  year  in 
expectation, valued at $154.39. Summing this figure across all vehicles, the total external cost 
of vehicle weight gain relative to the 1989 baseline vehicle is $35 billion per year. This figure 
represents the “weight gain since 1989” scenario but does not encompass the total external 
costs of vehicle weight.  
  Our second counterfactual scenario assumes the individual purchases the 3,616 lb 
vehicle (wi) over a vehicle weighing 1,850 lbs (wcf), which represents the lightest vehicle in 
mass  production  that  can  transport  at  least  two  adult  passengers  and  is  classified  as  an 
automobile. This is the approximate weight of Toyota’s iQ, Mercedes Benz’s Smart Car, or 
the first generation Honda Insight. The intuition behind calculating the total external cost 
using this baseline vehicle is that individuals privately choose the size of the externality by 
                                                 
30 For comparison, the probability in our sample of a fatality in a two-vehicle collision (conditional on the 
collision occurring) is 0.190%. 
31  We estimate the probability of being involved in an accident by dividing the total number of vehicles 
involved in multivehicle collisions by the total number of registered vehicles in 2005 (BTS, 2010 Table 1-11).  
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choosing a heavier vehicle than required to provide baseline transportation services. This 
calculation recognizes that a driver of a Smart Car poses little or no risk to other roadway 
users except bicyclists or motorcyclists.
32 
If  our  simulated  individual  chooses  a  vehicle  weighing  3,616  lbs  instead  of  one 
weighing  1,850  lbs,  she  causes  an  additional  0.000071  external  fatalities  per  year  in 
expectation, valued at $411.34. Summing across all drivers, this translates into a total external 
cost of $93 billion per year. This scenario, however, ignores the external fatality risks that 
vehicles pose to pedestrians and motorcyclists. In 2005, there were 2,659 motorcycle crash 
fatalities  (involving  light  vehicles)  and  5,864  non-motorist  fatalities  due  to  fatal  crashes 
(NHTSA 2010). This is equivalent to an external “baseline” fatality cost of $49.4 billion. The 
total external cost of “excess” vehicle weight and baseline fatality risk is therefore $142.4 
billion. 
The  above  calculations  ignore  the  impact  of  higher  striking  vehicle  weight  in 
multivehicle collisions with more than two vehicles. The majority of these accidents involve 
three vehicles. We repeat the simulation above but add the external costs in three-vehicle 
collisions. We assume that striking vehicle weight has half the causal effect (per vehicle 
struck) in three-vehicle accidents as compared to its effect in two-vehicle collisions. This 
assumption is conservative in comparison to our three-vehicle collision estimates in Table 5. 
These calculations raise external costs in the “weight gain since 1989” scenario to $38 billion 
and external costs in the “lightest possible vehicle” scenario to $101.6 billion. Total external 
costs rise to $151 billion.
33 
  While  the  magnitude  of  the  total  external  costs  is  a  straightforward  calculation, 
translating it into an optimal policy is not. The externality consists of fatalities in collisions 
with pedestrians, motorcyclists, and other vehicles. These costs, as discussed in Section 2, are 
not currently reflected in liability insurance because most coverage levels are far below the 
VSL of $5.8 million. One way to incorporate these external risks is to include them in a per 
mile insurance charge. In contrast to existing proposals for “pay as you drive” (PAYD) 
insurance (e.g. Parry 2005; Bordoff and Noel 2008), our results demonstrate that the per 
mile  insurance  charge  should  vary  sharply  by  weight  –  a  heavier  car  generates  greater 
                                                 
32 We do not consider a “zero weight” baseline vehicle because that weight lies far outside the support of our 
data. Furthermore, it is unclear what counterfactual to construct if the vehicle does not exist at all. Would the 
collision not occur, or would the struck vehicle instead hit a different vehicle or a roadside object? 
33 A spreadsheet detailing these calculations is available from the authors.   
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expected per mile external costs than a lighter car. In order to assess a tax that varies per 
pound and per mile, one needs accurate information on vehicle miles travelled (VMT) for 
each vehicle, which creates substantial monitoring challenges.  
A practical policy alternative is to distribute the total external costs by raising the 
gasoline tax assessed per gallon. Taxing gasoline is appealing because it is simple and because 
gasoline usage is positively related to both miles driven and vehicle weight. The United 
States consumed 140 billion gallons of gasoline in 2005 (EIA 2010). If we spread the total 
external costs calculated above across 140 billion gallons of gasoline, this translates into 27 
cents per gallon in the “weight gain since 1989” scenario ($38 billion/140 billion gallons = 
27 cents/gallon). The total externality due to vehicle fatalities when the baseline vehicle is 
1,850 pounds translates into a tax of 73 cents per gallon ($101.6 billion/140 billion gallons = 
73 cents/gallon). Including pedestrian and motorcycle fatalities translates into a tax of $1.08 
per gallon ($151 billion/140 billion gallons = $1.08/gallon). 
  While the gasoline tax does not differ by the type of vehicle fueled, it is correlated 
with vehicle weight, because heavier vehicles have lower fuel economy. Figure 3 plots a 
lowess smoother of miles per gallon (mpg) against vehicle weight, estimated for cars in 
model year 2005 using the data from Knittel (forthcoming).
34 There is a strong negative and  
slightly nonlinear relationship between the two variables. A linear regression indicates that an 
additional 1,000 pounds in vehicle weight decreases fuel economy by 4.5 mpg. A gas tax thus 
results in heavier vehicles indirectly paying a higher per mile tax through the correlation of 
mpg with vehicle weight. In this sense, the gas tax approximates a weight varying mileage 
tax. 
  A natural question is how close the gasoline tax comes to achieving the desired 
weight varying mileage tax. We perform a back of the envelope calculation using a large set 
of vehicles for which we have vehicle weight and mpg ratings from Knittel (forthcoming). 
For the analysis, we remove boutique vehicles, which essentially have zero market share (e.g. 
Lamborghini,  Ferrari,  Bentley),  flex  fuel  vehicles,  which  have  inflated  mpg  ratings  for 
accounting reasons, and a few miscoded observations. We examine vehicles built from 1997 
to 2006 to approximate the vehicle fleet in the last year of our sample. This sample contains 
                                                 
34 For this comparison, we require vehicle weight and EPA fuel economy ratings. The latter are not contained 
in our VIN decoder database, but Chris Knittel has graciously shared his model level data on weight and fuel 
economy ratings.   
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8,201 model-year combinations and includes most cars and light trucks sold in the United 
States during this period.  




! wi!wcf ( )"VSL"P accident ( )
VMT +cpedmot
e
    (6) 
where ! is again the estimated causal effect of vehicle weight on external fatalities (0.0011), 
wi is the chosen vehicle’s weight, wcf is the baseline vehicle’s weight, VSL is the value of a 
statistical life and P(accident) is the probability of being involved in a multivehicle collision. 
VMT are held constant for each model at 11,000 miles per year. The parameter cpedmot
e  is the 
total  number  of  fatalities  in  collisions  between  vehicles  and  pedestrians,  bicyclists  and 
motorcycles, multiplied by the VSL; it sums to $49.4 billion, or 1.65 cents per VMT. We 
calculate ci
e  for each model in our database. The average value of ci
e across all models is 5.4 
cents per mile, and it increases by 2.1 cents per mile for every 1,000 lb increase in wi. 





          (7) 
where  ce is the average per gallon external cost of fatalities in multivehicle collisions or 
collisions with pedestrians, bicyclists, or motorcycles. We calculate  ce above as $1.08 per 
gallon. For mpgi we use the standard 45/55 weighting of the EPA city and highway fuel 
economy  ratings.
35  The  gas  tax  per  mile  therefore  only  varies  across  models  through 
differences in fuel economy. 
  The weight-based tax displays higher variability, with a standard deviation of 1.6 
cents per mile compared to the gas tax’s standard deviation of 1.3 cents per mile. The 
difference between the two taxes for model i can be expressed as: 
!i = ci
g " ci
e = # +
ce
mpgi
"$wi    (8) 
                                                 
35 Pre-2008 EPA fuel economy ratings are widely recognized to overstate the actual mileage achieved by the 
average driver (Edmunds 2006). This affects our subsequent analysis because the $1.08 gas tax was derived 
from actual fuel economy rather than the EPA’s forecast fuel economy. We thus rescale the EPA ratings so 
that the average fuel economy in this sample matches the average fuel economy observed nationwide (17.8 
mpg), after adjusting for weight differences between the two samples. The rescaling factor that achieves this 
equivalence is 0.73. Our conclusions in the subsequent analysis are unchanged if we instead leave the EPA 
ratings untouched and recalculate the gas tax using EPA mileage ratings – in both cases the per mile gas tax 
closely tracks the weight based mileage tax.  
 






e  and ! =
" #VSL#P(accident)
VMT
. We keep both ! 
and " fixed at the values stated previously in this simulation. From equations (6) and (7), we 
see that the per mile weight tax increases in weight and the gas tax per mile decreases in fuel 
efficiency,  as  expected.  However,  an  interesting  relationship  emerges  for  the  difference 
between the two pricing tools, given in equation (8). "i is decreasing in better fuel efficiency 
and higher weight. A negative "i means that, for vehicle model i, the weight tax is higher 
than the gas tax. Thus, cars most heavily advantaged by the gas tax are heavy vehicles that 
are relatively fuel efficient for their size (e.g. Mercedes E320 CDI [35.5 mpg; 3,835 lbs]). 
Cars most heavily advantaged by the weight tax are lighter vehicles that are gas guzzlers 
compared to others their size (e.g. Ford GT [18.7 mpg; 3,351 lbs]). 
Figure 4 presents a scatterplot of the gas tax versus the weight tax for all models 
from 1997–2006 in the cleaned Knittel (forthcoming) database. The difference between the 
two taxes is small for most models, but it can be significant at the extremes, ranging between 
–3.7 cents to 5.3 cents per mile. A one cent difference per mile equates to $110 dollars on an 
annual basis. For 62% of the models in our database, the absolute value of the difference 
between the two taxes is less than one cent per mile, and for 95% of the models the absolute 
value of the difference is less than 2 cents per mile. The average difference between the two 
taxes is 0.69 cents per mile, which represents 12.9% of the average value of the per mile 
weight tax. 
A related question is what level of gas tax would best mimic the weight tax across all 
models. For any gas tax set at c  per gallon, we can write the following equation: 
ci
e = c ! 1
mpgi +!i          (9) 
In this equation,  c ! 1
mpgi  equals the gas tax per mile for vehicle i (dollars/gallon 
divided by miles/gallon = dollars/mile), and !i  equals the difference between the gas tax per 
mile  and  the  weight  based  mileage  tax.  If  we  specify  a  quadratic  loss  function,  we  can 
estimate the gas tax that best mimics the weight tax by estimating a least squares regression 
of the weight based mileage tax on the inverse of miles per gallon.
36 Each observation in this 
                                                 
36 Equation (9) reveals that we must constrain the intercept to be zero in this regression – the only degree of 
freedom in setting the gas tax comes from choosing c .  
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regression is a different vehicle model. The resulting estimate from this OLS regression is 
c = $0.96 per gallon, which is similar in magnitude to our previously computed tax of $1.08 
(though the two quantities are significantly different at the 5% level).
37 The total revenue 
raised by either of the gas taxes is close to the total revenue raised by the mileage based tax. 
In all cases, the revenues could be redistributed to make the taxes revenue neutral. 
  While  many  countries  encourage  fuel  efficiency  through  high  gasoline  taxes,  the 
United  States  encourages  fuel  efficiency  through  CAFE  standards.  In  principle,  fuel 
economy standards could achieve the same “downsizing” of the vehicle fleet as a gasoline 
tax – a properly specified fuel economy standard should act as a de facto tax on heavier 
vehicles.  A  primary  difference  between  the  two  instruments  is  that  the  fuel  economy 
standard “tax” would be collected when purchasing the vehicle and would be amortized over 
the  vehicle’s  lifetime  VMT,  while  the  gas  tax  would  be  collected  in  small  increments 
throughout the life of the vehicle. This difference could be important if consumers exhibit 
high discount rates or if salience is important (Finkelstein 2009). Calculating the exact fuel 
economy standards that achieve equivalent effects to a $1.08 per gallon gas tax is beyond the 
scope of this paper, as it requires a variety of supply and demand elasticities. Nevertheless, 
we note two important points in the context of CAFE standards. 
First, current CAFE standards are insufficient to internalize the externality presented 
in this paper. Goldberg (1998) estimates that CAFE increases the price of pickup trucks by 
0.6% and reduces the price of subcompacts by 0.5%. This equates to a tax on pickup trucks 
(relative to subcompacts) of approximately $200. The gasoline tax discussed above, however, 
equates to a tax on pickup trucks (relative to subcompacts) of over $4,000 over the life of 
the vehicle. Second, the light truck coefficient in Table 2 suggests that removing the current 
split in CAFE standards between cars and light trucks would improve welfare. The results in 
Table 2 imply that light truck frames impose significant external risks upon other roadway 
users but provide little or no safety benefit to their own occupants. This suggests that light 
truck purchases should be discouraged, but current CAFE standards encourage light truck 
production by imposing a much lower mileage standard on trucks than on cars. 
 
                                                 
37 The least squares regression minimizes the sum of squared deviations. We can alternatively estimate a median 
regression to minimize the sum of absolute deviations. The median regression coefficient is $0.95, which is 
virtually identical to the OLS coefficient of $0.96.  
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7.  CONCLUSION 
 
  The US vehicle fleet has become significantly heavier over the past two decades. The 
average car on the road in 2008 was roughly 530 pounds heavier than the average car on the 
road  in  1988,  representing  a  20%  increase.  This  trend  and  its  potential  traffic  safety 
implications  have  been  widely  discussed  by  policymakers  when  contemplating  more 
stringent fuel economy standards or greenhouse gas emissions standards. However, it is less 
widely recognized that an unregulated vehicle fleet is inefficiently heavy due to the “arms 
race” nature of vehicle choice. In this paper, we estimate the external effects of choosing a 
heavier  vehicle  on  fatalities  in  two-vehicle  collisions.  We  present  robust  evidence  that 
increasing striking vehicle weight by 1,000 pounds increases the probability of a fatality in 
the struck vehicle by 40% to 50%. This finding is unchanged across different specifications, 
estimation  methods,  and  different  subsets  of  the  sample.  We  show  that  there  are  also 
significant impacts on serious injuries. 
  The external costs of fatalities are currently not internalized in the form of a first- or 
second-best policy. We calculate that a simple gasoline tax that internalizes the fleet weight 
gain since 1989 is 27 cents per gallon. We further calculate that internalizing the total cost of 
external fatalities due to vehicle weight and operation, including crashes with motorcycles 
and pedestrians, requires a tax on the order of $1.08 per gallon. Parry and Small (2005), 
applying a lower VSL to monetize other external costs and not accounting for the vehicle 
weight  externality,  calculate  an  optimal  value  of  $1.01  per  gallon  for  the  U.S.  gas  tax 
(approximately 60 cents above its current level). Internalizing the vehicle weight externality 
would increase this optimal value substantially.  
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 Figure 1: External Costs of Vehicle Weight 
   Figure 2: Marginal Effects of Striking Vehicle Weight 
 














































Striking Vehicle Weight 
Linear OLS  Quadratic OLS 
Quadratic OLS w/Interaction  Linear Probit 
Quadratic Probit  Quadratic Probit w/Interaction Figure 3: Fuel Economy vs. Weight for 2005 Model Year Light Vehicles Figure 4: Sunflower Scatterplot of Gas Tax vs. Weight Tax for Cars and Trucks  
 
Notes: The graph above displays the joint distribution of the weight tax and gas tax per mile 
for the sample of cars and trucks with model years 1997-2006 from the database provided by 
Knittel (forthcoming). We remove boutique cars, flex fuel vehicles, and a few outliers with 
incorrectly recorded fuel ratings. The sunflower plot bunches multiple observations into 
single  flowers,  where  the  number  of  petals  indicates  the  total  number  of  observations 
represented by the flower. The petals of light flowers represent one observation each and the 
petals of darker flowers represent 13 observations each. Mean  Sample Size Mean  Sample Size
(Std Dev) (Std Dev)
Weight 3,076 lbs 4,849,575 3,113 lbs 2,829,768
(685) (694)
Light Truck 24.5% 4,849,575 25.8% 2,829,768
(43.0) (43.8)
Model Year 1992 4,849,575 1993 2,829,768
(5.6) (5.7)
Accident Year 1998 4,849,575 1999 2,829,768
(4.4) (4.3)
Occupants 1.41 2,608,821 1.45 1,476,441
(0.84) (0.87)
Fatality 0.19% 4,849,575 0.23% 2,829,768
(4.36) (4.83)
Serious Injury 2.7% 4,849,575 3.4% 2,829,768
(16.1) (18.0)
Alcohol Involved 8.3% 2,753,533 10.0% 1,723,694
(27.6) (30.1)
Table 1:  Summary Statistics for Two-Vehicle Collision Data Set
Notes: Both samples are limited to collisions involving two light vehicles built post-1980.
The complete covariates sample is further limited to collisions in which all covariates in our
preferred specification are non-missing.
Complete Covariates Sample Base SampleDependent Variable: Presence of Fatalities in Struck Vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Weight of Striking Vehicle (1000s of lbs) 0.00088 0.12685 0.00093 0.12797 0.00101 0.13440 0.00110 0.00065 0.00064
(0.00004) (0.00531) (0.00005) (0.00616) (0.00005) (0.00685) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Effect of 1000 lb Increase in Striking Vehicle Weight/ 0.00088 0.00077 0.00093 0.00085 0.00101 0.00086 0.00110 0.00065 0.00064
    Percent Increase Over Sample Mean 46% 41% 42% 38% 44% 37% 47% 49% 48%
Weight of Struck Vehicle (1000s of lbs) -0.00047 -0.08196 -0.00053 -0.08548 -0.00101 -0.15988 -0.00097 -0.00060 -0.00065
(0.00004) (0.00644) (0.00004) (0.00727) (0.00005) (0.00815) (0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Striking Vehicle is Light Truck 0.00117 0.15977 0.00105 0.13016 0.00088 0.10113 0.00093 0.00054 0.00054
(0.00006) (0.00861) (0.00008) (0.00958) (0.00009) (0.01075) (0.00009) (0.00010) (0.00010)
Struck Vehicle is Light Truck -0.00014 -0.02541 -0.00036 -0.06192 -0.00001 -0.03605 0.00021 -0.00015 -0.00012
(0.00006) (0.00987) (0.00007) (0.01081) (0.00007) (0.01154) (0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00009)
Specification OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS OLS OLS
Weather, Time, and County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Driver Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Occupants and Seat Belt Usage Yes
Sample Size 4,849,575 4,849,575 3,572,439 3,536,684 3,223,746 3,197,882 2,829,768 1,470,596 1,470,596
Table 2: Effect of Vehicle Weight on Fatalities
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The estimation sample is limited to collisions involving two vehicles. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the
collision level. Effects of a 1,000 lb increase in striking vehicle weight are computed as the average effect of a 1,000 lb increase in weight across all observations included in the
regression. All regressions include as right-hand-side variables the weight of each vehicle, indicators for whether each vehicle is a light truck, and year fixed effects. Weather, time, and
county fixed effects controls include rain, darkness, day of week (weekday versus weekend), Interstate highway, a quadratic in model year for each vehicle, and year, hour, and county
fixed effects. Driver characteristic controls include quadratics in driver age, indicators for drivers under 21 or over 60, indicators for male drivers and young male drivers, and
indicators for any seat belt usage in the vehicle.Dependent Variable: Presence of Serious Injuries in Struck Vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Weight of Striking Vehicle (1000s of lbs) 0.00484 0.07616 0.00573 0.08332 0.00615 0.08494 0.00687 0.00324 0.00316
(0.00014) (0.00207) (0.00017) (0.00242) (0.00019) (0.00260) (0.00021) (0.00020) (0.00020)
Effect of 1000 lb Increase in Striking Vehicle Weight/ 0.00484 0.00470 0.00573 0.00543 0.00615 0.00563 0.00687 0.00324 0.00316
    Percent Increase Over Sample Mean 18% 18% 19% 18% 19% 17% 20% 20% 20%
Weight of Struck Vehicle (1000s of lbs) -0.00720 -0.12392 -0.00797 -0.12874 -0.00921 -0.14280 -0.00891 -0.00479 -0.00514
(0.00013) (0.00226) (0.00016) (0.00261) (0.00018) (0.00282) (0.00020) (0.00019) (0.00019)
Striking Vehicle is Light Truck 0.00567 0.08524 0.00456 0.06400 0.00412 0.05399 0.00448 0.00215 0.00215
(0.00022) (0.00322) (0.00027) (0.00367) (0.00029) (0.00392) (0.00032) (0.00030) (0.00030)
Struck Vehicle is Light Truck -0.00033 -0.00894 -0.00212 -0.03734 -0.00075 -0.02072 0.00005 -0.00069 -0.00048
(0.00020) (0.00343) (0.00024) (0.00389) (0.00027) (0.00414) (0.00029) (0.00028) (0.00028)
Specification OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS OLS OLS
Weather, Time, and County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Driver Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Occupants and Seat Belt Usage Yes
Sample Size 4,849,575 4,849,575 3,572,439 3,571,255 3,223,746 3,223,344 2,829,768 1,470,596 1,470,596
Table 3: Effect of Vehicle Weight on Serious Injuries
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The estimation sample is limited to collisions involving two vehicles. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the
collision level. Effects of a 1,000 lb increase in striking vehicle weight are computed as the average effect of a 1,000 lb increase in weight across all observations included in the
regression. All regressions include as right-hand-side variables the weight of each vehicle, indicators for whether each vehicle is a light truck, and year fixed effects. Weather, time, and
county fixed effects controls include rain, darkness, day of week (weekday versus weekend), Interstate highway, a quadratic in model year for each vehicle, and year, hour, and county
fixed effects. Driver characteristic controls include quadratics in driver age, indicators for drivers under 21 or over 60, indicators for male drivers and young male drivers, and
indicators for any seat belt usage in the vehicle.Dependent Variable:  Presence of Fatalities in Struck Vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weight of Striking Vehicle (1000s of lbs) 0.00099 0.00083 0.40831 0.41150
(0.00030) (0.00031) (0.04016) (0.04048)
Effect of 1000 lb Increase in Striking Vehicle Weight/ 0.00101 0.00101 0.00096 0.00096
    Percent Increase Over Sample Mean 44% 43% 41% 41%
Weight of Striking Vehicle Squared 0.00000 0.00003 -0.03802 -0.03843
(0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00549) (0.00553)
Weight of Striking Vehicle -0.00031 0.00611
    * Weight of Struck Vehicle (0.00007) (0.00884)
Specification OLS OLS Probit Probit
Sample Size 3,223,746 3,223,746 3,197,882 3,197,882
Table 4: Heterogeneous Effects of Vehicle Weight on Fatalities
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The estimation sample is limited to collisions involving two vehicles.
Parentheses contain standard errors clustered at the collision level. Effects of a 1,000 lb increase in striking vehicle weight are
computed as the average effect of a 1,000 lb increase in weight across all observations included in the regression. All
regressions include the following right-hand-side variables: weight of each vehicle, a quadratic in model year for each vehicle,
indicators for whether each vehicle is a light truck, rain, darkness, day of week (weekday versus weekend), Interstate highway,
quadratics in driver age, indicators for drivers under 21 or over 60, indicators for male drivers and young male drivers,
indicators for any seat belt usage in the vehicle, and year, hour, and city fixed effects.Dependent Variable: Presence of Fatalities in Struck Vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Weight of Striking Vehicle (1000s of lbs) 0.00088 0.11785 0.00086 0.10934 0.00081 0.10541 0.00086 0.00065 0.00064
(0.00010) (0.01203) (0.00012) (0.01391) (0.00013) (0.01583) (0.00014) (0.00019) (0.00019)
Effect of 1000 lb Increase in Striking Vehicle Weight/ 0.00088 0.00078 0.00086 0.00083 0.00081 0.00079 0.00086 0.00065 0.00064
    Percent Increase Over Sample Mean 42% 37% 36% 32% 32% 28% 35% 42% 41%
Weight of Struck Vehicle (1000s of lbs) -0.00062 -0.09830 -0.00078 -0.11463 -0.00127 -0.19317 -0.00109 -0.00079 -0.00084
(0.00011) (0.01865) (0.00014) (0.02104) (0.00016) (0.02415) (0.00017) (0.00023) (0.00024)
Striking Vehicle is Light Truck 0.00064 0.08021 0.00055 0.06840 0.00056 0.06530 0.00061 0.00039 0.00039
(0.00014) (0.01863) (0.00017) (0.02044) (0.00019) (0.02345) (0.00020) (0.00030) (0.00030)
Struck Vehicle is Light Truck -0.00022 -0.03293 -0.00031 -0.05346 0.00031 0.00197 0.00051 -0.00014 -0.00012
(0.00018) (0.02969) (0.00022) (0.03178) (0.00024) (0.03484) (0.00026) (0.00036) (0.00036)
Specification OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS OLS OLS
Weather, Time, and County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Driver Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Occupants and Seat Belt Usage Yes
Sample Size 518,378 518,378 391,456 356,970 348,543 306,684 317,769 110,541 110,541
Table 5: Effect of Vehicle Weight on Fatalities in Three-Vehicle Accidents
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The estimation sample is limited to collisions involving three vehicles. Striking vehicle weight coefficients represent the average
effect of increasing the weight of one striking vehicle by 1,000 pounds; they are the average of the coefficients on the first and second striking vehicles. Parentheses contain standard
errors clustered at the collision level. Effects of a 1,000 lb increase in striking vehicle weight are computed as the average effect of a 1,000 lb increase in the weight of one striking
vehicle across all observations included in the regression. All regressions include as right-hand-side variables the weight of each vehicle, indicators for whether each vehicle is a light
truck, and year fixed effects. Weather, time, and county fixed effects controls include rain, darkness, day of week (weekday versus weekend), Interstate highway, a quadratic in model
year for each vehicle, and year, hour, and county fixed effects. Driver characteristic controls include quadratics in driver age, indicators for drivers under 21 or over 60, indicators for
male drivers and young male drivers, and indicators for any seat belt usage in the vehicle.Dependent Variable: HIC HIC>700 HIC HIC>700
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weight of Vehicle 17.7 0.024 38.2 0.018
(16.1) (0.018) (43.5) (0.040)
Percentage Effect of 3.0% 8.7% 6.7% 7.2%
  1,000 lb Increase
Sales Share Weighted Yes Yes
Sample Size 4,788 4,788 2,847 2,847
Table 6: Relationship Between Vehicle Weight and NHTSA Crash Test Performance
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The estimation sample in the first two
columns contains all NHTSA vehicle-to-barrier frontal crash test results. The estimation sample
in the last two columns contains only crash tests involving vehicles for which we have sales share
data. Parentheses contain standard errors clustered by vehicle make. All regressions include the
following right-hand-side variables: weight of tested vehicle, a quadratic in model year, a light
truck indicator, and a quadratic in collision speed. Sales share weighted regressions are weighted
by the tested vehicle's sales share for a given year.Dependent Variable: Presence of Fatalities in Struck Vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Vehicle Weight in Collision (1000s of lbs) -0.00004 -0.00110 0.00003 -0.00181
     (0.00017) (0.00108) (0.00023) (0.00137)
Effect of 1000 lb Increase in Average Weight/ -0.00004 -0.00110 0.00003 -0.00181
    Percent Increase Over Sample Mean -2% -19% 2% -35%
Max Weight Difference Between Vehicles 200 lbs 200 lbs 100 lbs 100 lbs
Frontal Collisions Only Yes Yes
Sample Size 539,350 39,242 288,988 20,488
Table 7: Effect of Vehicle Weight in Collisions Between Two Equal Weight Vehicles
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The estimation sample is limited to collisions in which the difference
in weight between the two vehicles is less than 200 lbs (first two columns) or 100 lbs (last two columns). Parentheses
contain standard errors clustered at the collision level. Effects of a 1,000 lb increase in striking vehicle weight are
computed as the average effect of a 1,000 lb increase in weight across all observations included in the regression. All
regressions include the following right-hand-side variables: weight of each vehicle, a quadratic in model year for each
vehicle, indicators for whether each vehicle is a light truck, rain, darkness, day of week (weekday versus weekend),
Interstate highway, quadratics in driver age, indicators for drivers under 21 or over 60, indicators for male drivers and
young male drivers, indicators for any seat belt usage in the vehicle, and year, hour, and city fixed effects.Dependent Variable: Presence of Fatalities in Struck Vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weight of Vehicle 0.00044 0.00030 0.00153 0.00434
    (1000s of lbs) (0.00026) (0.00048) (0.00655) (0.01330)
Effect of 1000 lb Increase in Vehicle Weight/ 0.00044 0.00030 0.00005 0.00014
    Percent Increase Over Sample Mean 3% 2% 0% 1%
Collision Type 1 Vehicle 1 Veh, Frontal 1 Vehicle 1 Veh, Frontal
Specification OLS OLS Probit Probit
Sample Size 774,790 224,696 916,766 223,236
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The estimation sample is limited to collisions involving a single vehicle.
Parentheses contain robust standard errors. Effects of a 1,000 lb increase in vehicle weight are computed as the average effect of
a 1,000 lb increase in weight across all observations included in the regression. All regressions include the following right-hand-
side variables: weight of vehicle, a quadratic in model year, indicators for whether a vehicle is a light truck, rain, darkness, day of
week (weekday versus weekend), Interstate highway, quadratic in driver age, indicators for drivers under 21 or over 60, indicators
for male drivers and young male drivers, indicators for any seat belt usage in the vehicle, and year, hour, and either city fixed
effects (OLS) or county fixed effects (probit).
Table 8: Effect of Vehicle Weight on Fatalities in Single-Vehicle CollisionsDependent Variable: Presence of Fatalities in Struck Vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weight of Striking Vehicle/ 0.00058 0.00072 0.00064 0.00062
    Additional Weight in Striking Vehicle (1000s of lbs) (0.00008) (0.00016) (0.00006) (0.00026)
Effect of 1000 lb Increase in Striking Vehicle Weight/ 0.00058 0.00072 0.00064 0.00062
    Percent Increase Over Sample Mean 47% 58% 48% 46%
Specification OLS OLS w/Model FEs OLS IV
Sample Size 1,011,982 1,011,982 1,475,762 1,475,762
Table 9: Effect of Vehicle Weight on Fatalities Using Alternative Sources of Identification
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The estimation sample is limited to collisions involving two vehicles. Parentheses contain
standard errors clustered at the collision level. Effects of a 1,000 lb increase in striking vehicle weight are computed as the average effect of a
1,000 lb increase in weight across all observations included in the regression. All regressions include the following right-hand-side variables:
weight of each vehicle, a quadratic in model year for each vehicle, indicators for whether each vehicle is a light truck, rain, darkness, day of week
(weekday versus weekend), Interstate highway, quadratics in driver age, indicators for drivers under 21 or over 60, indicators for male drivers and
young male drivers, indicators for any seat belt usage in the vehicle, and year and hour fixed effects. OLS regressions with model fixed effects
contain fixed effects for each vehicle model and county fixed effects. IV regressions contain city fixed effects and use the number of occupants in
the striking vehicle times 164 lbs per occupant as the instrument for additional weight in the striking vehicle weight.Dependent Variable: Presence of Fatalities in Struck Vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Weight of Striking Vehicle (1000s of lbs) 0.00085 0.16826 0.00086 0.15696 0.00096 0.17577 0.00105 0.00041 0.00041
(0.00005) (0.00881) (0.00006) (0.01010) (0.00007) (0.01187) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00007)
Effect of 1000 lb Increase in Striking Vehicle Weight/ 0.00085 0.00084 0.00086 0.00087 0.00096 0.00094 0.00105 0.00041 0.00041
    Percent Increase Over Sample Mean 56% 56% 49% 48% 52% 50% 57% 43% 42%
Weight of Struck Vehicle (1000s of lbs) -0.00032 -0.06786 -0.00047 -0.08552 -0.00117 -0.20630 -0.00111 -0.00059 -0.00061
(0.00005) (0.01014) (0.00006) (0.01142) (0.00007) (0.01281) (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00008)
Specification OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS OLS OLS
Weather, Time, and County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Driver Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
City Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Occupants and Seat Belt Usage Yes
Sample Size 2,801,186 2,801,186 2,012,046 1,962,129 1,815,558 1,771,574 1,578,094 824,544 824,544
Table A1: Effect of Vehicle Weight on Fatalities in Accidents Excluding Light Trucks
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The estimation sample is limited to collisions involving two cars – collisions involving light trucks are excluded. Parentheses
contain standard errors clustered at the collision level. Effects of a 1,000 lb increase in striking vehicle weight are computed as the average effect of a 1,000 lb increase in weight
across all observations included in the regression. All regressions include as right-hand-side variables the weight of each vehicle and year fixed effects. Weather, time, and county fixed
effects controls include rain, darkness, day of week (weekday versus weekend), Interstate highway, a quadratic in model year for each vehicle, and year, hour, and county fixed effects.
Driver characteristic controls include quadratics in driver age, indicators for drivers under 21 or over 60, indicators for male drivers and young male drivers, and indicators for any seat
belt usage in the vehicle.Dependent Variable: Presence of Fatalities in Struck Vehicle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weight of Striking Vehicle (1000s of lbs) 0.00046 0.00115 0.00063 0.00135
(0.00005) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00008)
Effect of 1000 lb Increase in Striking Vehicle Weight/ 0.00046 0.00115 0.00063 0.00135
    Percent Increase Over Sample Mean 46% 44% 51% 44%
Percent of Accidents with Missing Weight Data 24% 41% 24% 41%
Weather, Time, Driver, and City Controls   Yes Yes
Sample Size 2,144,719 2,704,856 1,103,620 1,726,148
Table A2: Effect of Vehicle Weight on Fatalities for States with High and Low Missing Weight Data
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The estimation sample is limited to collisions involving two vehicles
Columns (1) and (3) are estimated using data from states in which a low proportion of observations are missing weight data
(Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming). Columns (2) and (4) are estimated using data from states in which a high proportion of
observations are missing weight data (Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri). Parentheses contain standard
errors clustered at the collision level. All regressions include as right-hand-side variables the weight of each vehicle, indicators
for whether each vehicle is a light truck, and year fixed effects. Weather, time, driver, and city controls include rain, darkness,
day of week (weekday versus weekend), Interstate highway, quadratics in driver age, indicators for drivers under 21 or over 60,
indicators for male drivers and young male drivers, indicators for any seat belt usage in the vehicle, and year, hour, and city
fixed effects.